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ANDSF training – where did it go so wrong? (Analysis)

17th August 2021 - 17:18 GMT | by Trevor Nash in Holsworthy

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Fear of the Taliban and a lack of confidence in a corrupt government did little to install confidence in the ANDSF. (Photo: DVIDS)

NATO and ISAF forces in Afghanistan have been training the ANDSF for many years, but when it came to the acid test of independent combat, Afghan forces were simply not up to the task. Why?

Although many refer to Afghanistan as ‘the graveyard of empires', this cliché does in part describe how the three Anglo-Afghan wars starting in 1839, the Soviet occupation from 1979 to 1989 and the US/NATO presence from 2001 to 2021, have ended in military failure and humiliation.

The 2001 US invasion to remove the Taliban government and its support and harbouring of the al-Qaeda terrorist network was rapidly terminated by President Joe Biden, without any awareness of the thought and time needed to establish a robust handover process and exit strategy.

There is, however, a counter-narrative to this view

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