Australia has no looming submarine capability gap, at least according to the RAN
The USN currently has 19 nuclear-powered Virginia-class SSN vessels in service, with USS North Dakota pictured here. (USN)
The cancellation of the 12-submarine Attack-class programme with Naval Group has cost the Australian taxpayer €555 million ($583 million), Canberra revealed on 11 June.
The Australian government and its former client negotiated the above fee, which was described as ‘fair and equitable’. Australia’s newly installed government added, ‘Now that the matter is resolved, we can move forward with the relationship with France.’
However, the total cost of the failed submarine programme is more like A$3.4 billion ($2.35 billion), considering the money already spent. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese described it as ‘an extraordinary waste from a government that was always
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