US has bitten off more than it can chew with M-Code, say experts

A modernised military M-Code would be more effective than other tools at securing GPS by resisting adversaries’ jamming, spoofing, misdirection and other EW exploits.

Demand is high for M-Code given its stronger transmission power, broad-spectrum operations and other, classified advantages over Selective Availability Spoofing Module decryption and P(Y) code encryption, to give two examples.

However, the US GAO claimed in a 9 May report that there is a striking imbalance. While 24 of 31 US GPS satellites (described in the report as the ‘aerial sector’) are equipped to broadcast the code, the crucial ‘ground segment’ (control stations and would-be users) are not synched to it.

One reason is a serious shortfall in receivers for some 700 fittable weapons systems and countless sub-systems awaiting integration. This prevents widespread M-Code implementation, which is a long-standing goal for the DoD.

Justin Sanders, CSIS deputy director and fellow with the Defence-Industrial Initiatives Group, said: ‘When integrating multiple complex systems, each step after the first is harder.’

As a result, a vital ‘connecting’ piece — the OCX ground control programme led by Raytheon — faces ‘years of delays’, he added.

Sanders noted to Shephard that, in common with many troubled DoD undertakings, OCX is ‘joint, ambitious, software-intensive, and involves integrating a wide range of systems’.

In other words, project and programme managers are taking on too many things at once.

John Pike, national security analyst and director of GlobalSecurity.org, took stock of the immense M-Code challenges. ’There are a lot of moving parts, implemented by a lot of different, [fiercely competitive] defence contractors — with the space segment in one house, the ground segment and the user equipment in the other,’ he told Shephard.

‘When integrating multiple complex systems, each step after the first is harder’— Justin Sanders, CSIS

For their part, Pike noted, leading manufacturers like BAE Systems and Lockheed Martin are efficiently making high-technology GPS satellite and M-Code equipment: ‘Sure, there’s a lot of really good stuff out there; it’s just not in the hands of the troops because it’s got so many hoops to jump through!’

Efforts to enhance position, navigation and timing (PNT) align closely with M-Code and face similar hurdles. Dana Gower, an ex-admiral in the US Coast Guard and head of the Position, Navigation and Timing Foundation, acknowledged ‘[the Pentagon] has had a lot of problems’ implementing M-Code, which was first proposed about 20 years ago.

‘It’s a lot slower arriving … than most people had hoped,’ he said.

Gower acknowledged the ‘many different priorities within DoD for leadership attention and procurement and funding’, although he claimed that ’GPS overall has worked pretty well’.

Complexities impeding the deployment of M-Code are causing concern for EW experts.

Wayne Shaw, an ex-president of the Association of Old Crows, warned that ‘we really have to worry about cybersecurity’ on the ground segment alone, while for the late-coming OCX, ‘they’re writing about 1.5 million lines of computer code’ for it, with a lot of potential errors’.

He added: ‘It’s an incredible effort to get all those systems and individual parts integrated — you can bet there’s an Integrated Project Team for all of them — where to put that M-Code card, is there space in the motherboard, adequate cooling, et cetera and so on.’

In its report, the GAO forecast that M-Code may become fully operational in the next two years, but Shaw believes ’another decade’ is likelier.