How the Hormuz mine threat exposes potential Baltic MCM shortfalls
The Tripartite-class minehunters were formed from a joint venture between France, Belgium and the Netherlands. (Photo: Royal Netherlands Navy)
The laying of mines by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz has highlighted potential deficiencies in the minehunting capabilities of Western nations to defend key assets such as oil and gas transport lanes in the Middle East from such threats by adversarial states.
With limited capabilities in the region, Western navies have had to scramble to reconfigure existing vessels to conduct mine countermeasure (MCM) operations. Examples of this include the Royal Navy’s (RN) recent conversion of RFA Lyme Bay and the US Navy’s reliance on its Independence-class littoral combat ship to keep its own assets safe.
The Baltic Sea
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